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Abstract
One crucial aspect of any verifiable electronic voting system that uses encryption is the
proof that the vote encryption is well-formed, i.e. the proof that the vote encryption
encrypts a valid vote accordingly to the race specification. It makes no sense accepting
an encrypted vote if, at the end of the election, the vote cannot be included in the tally
because it is badly formed.
Proving the validity of a complex vote encryption, without revealing the vote, is a
hard problem. This paper first contribution addresses exactly that problem and provides
a set of new constructions to create a vote encryption and the corresponding public proof
of validity for several types of complex ballots ([kmin, kmax]-out-of-n approval, weighted
and ranked ballots. The second contribution is a technique that allows to create a single,
constant size, verification code for a ballot containing one or several races of any mix of
the race types considered. With this single verification code the voter can verify that her
vote was casted-as-intended.
Moreover, our constructions can be tuned for either mix net or homomorphic tallying
and support both types of tallying in the same multi-race ballot.
Keywords: Verifiable vote encryption, complex ballots, electronic voting,
cast-as-intended verification, verification codes
1. Introduction
Elections are essential for a democratic society as they are the basis of our democra-
cies. Therefore, in order to allow free voting to everyone, it is critical that the election
system ensures the correctness of the elections’ results while preserving the voter’s pri-
vacy.
An election system should not only provide proofs that the votes are counted correctly
but also that they capture the intention of the voters, preserving the anonymity of the
votes. While the techniques to provide an electronic verifiable tally are well established,
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the same cannot be said about the techniques to prove that a vote encryption performed
by an untrusted machine encrypts the voter’s vote intention.
This paper describes a set of new constructions inspired on the MarkPledge family of
voter verifiable vote encryption protocols [38, 4, 32]. Despite significant differences at the
technical details, at a high level, a MarkPledge voter verification protocol is a slightly
modified version of a fairly straightforward zero-knowledge proof, in which the voter
chooses the challenge and performs a simple string comparison to verify that her vote
was encrypted correctly. All equations necessary for soundness are publicly verifiable,
thus can be verified by any interested party, including the voter, using an independent
machine.
To our knowledge, our constructions are the first to offer a highly sound voter veri-
fication mechanism for complex ballots with a constant size vote verification code. The
use of a single verification code requires the voter to have access to a trusted piece of soft-
ware/hardware to help her compute the verification code from the public election data
and hers secret selections. We also show how to create a more traditional code voting
receipt (with one verification code per candidate) from our constructions. This receipt
allows the voter to verify the correct vote encryption without the need of a trusted device,
although, like other vote confirmation techniques that use one verification code for each
vote selection, it rapidly becomes unusable with the increase of the ballot complexity.
In this work we only address the problem of creating a voter verifiable vote encryption
and prove it to be honest-verifier zero-knowledge. We do not propose any full vote
protocol, although the adaptation to the coercion resistant protocol in [3] or the simplified
vote protocol described in [38] is straightforward.
The new constructions proposed in this paper are very flexibly and allow to support in
an uniform way several types of complex ballots ([kmin, kmax]-out-of-n, weighted, ranked
and multi-race ballots). It can be tuned for either mix net or homomorphic tallying,
allowing even the use of both types of tallying on different races in a single multi-race
ballot. This flexibility can be very useful in anonymous surveys where some answers
must be correlated.
One crucial aspect of our vote encryption verification constructions, and of electronic
voting in general, is the proof that the vote encryption is well-formed, i.e. the proof that
the vote encryption encrypts a valid vote accordingly to the race specification. It makes
no sense in verifying a vote encryption if, at the end of the election, the vote cannot be
included in the tally because it is badly formed.
We solve the vote encryption well-formness verification problem by: i) creating the
vote encryption from a verifiable shuﬄe of a set of encryptions of known messages; and
ii) whenever necessary, using additional zero-knowledge proofs of compliance to the vote
specification. To our knowledge this approach is new and completely different from
the previous ones that impose a certain mathematical structure to the vote plaintext
construction, e.g. [28].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section presents the
related work. Then, section 3 gives the background necessary for our constructions.
Section 4 details the constructions for mix net tallying and section 5 describe the con-
structions for homomorphic tallying. Section 6 shows how to extract a MarkPledge style
voter verifiable receipt from our complex ballot encryption constructions and section 7
presents the conclusions.
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2. Related work
In 2004, with the work of Chaum [14] and Neff [38] a new paradigm in electronic
voting research has emerged: End-to-End (E2E) voting systems. The goal of E2E voting
systems is to develop voting systems with both voter cast-as-intended and universal
counted-as-cast verifications.
Chaum, in [14], addresses the voter cast-as-intended verification using visual cryptog-
raphy [37]. His proposal uses special printers that print a human readable vote encryption
on two overlapped transparent sheets.
Later the Preˆt-a`-Voter [20, 43, 48] and the Punchscan [15, 40] systems simplified the
original Chaum’s setup using pre-printed ballots. Adida and Rivest proposed the Scratch-
and-Vote system [5], based on Preˆt-a`-Voter, which uses scratch strips to allow off-line
ballot verification. In 2007, Moran and Naor [36] proposed an everlasting private1 system
based on Punchscan. The E2E ideas proposed in Punchscan served also as inspiration for
the development of the optical scanner based E2E verifiable voting system Scantegrity
[17], which was improved in Scantegrity II [16] with the incorporation of vote confirmation
codes. All these protocols, have pre-printed ballots, which allow for a ballot auditing
process before the election to minimize the risk of using bogus ballots.
The ideas of the above described poll station E2E systems where later adapted to
the Internet voting scenario in the Pretty Good Democracy (PGD) [44] and the Scratch,
Click and Vote (SCV) [33] voting systems. PGD achieves E2E verifiability by enhancing
a code voting protocol inspired by some ideas used in the Scantegrity II and Preˆt-a`-Voter
systems. PGD was later enhanced to support expressive voting schemes in which the
voter lists the candidates in order of preference [29]. SCV uses the voter cast-as-intended
verification ideas of Punchscan, Preˆt-a`-Voter and ThreeBallot2.
Neff’s proposal [38] (also known as MarkPledge) uses a quite different approach. It
codifies a verification code for each candidate into a set of 1-out-of-2 cut and choose proofs
of encryption. The verification codes are then computed from each set of encryptions
and a vote receipt with a random looking verification code for each candidate is created.
This technique achieves a soundness of 1/2α for a verification code with a length of α
bits. Neff’s proposal main disadvantages are: i) the high computational costs; and ii) the
complex vote protocol, which forces the voter to perform a complex challenge-response
style protocol with the voting machine, at the voting booth. The usability issues were
addressed in [3, 31] and the efficiency issues in [4, 32]. Moran and Naor presented a
MarkPledge like system with “everlasting privacy” [35] by replacing the vote encryptions
with bit commitments.
A completely different voter verification approach was proposed by Benaloh in [8, 9].
Benaloh’s proposal separates the vote encryption from the vote casting process. There is
a vote preparation machine that encrypts the vote but does not cast it, instead it delivers
the vote encryption to the voter in a paper support. The voter can then choose to cast
the encrypted vote or to verify it by asking the vote preparation machine to decrypt it.
In this solution the voter can verify as many vote encryptions as she wants until she
1Moran and Naor define that a system has “everlasting” privacy if a computational unbounded
adversary gains no information about specific votes from observing the protocol’s output.
2The ThreeBallot system is a paper based voter verifiable voting system proposed by Rivest [41, 42]
which “does not” use any cryptography.
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gains confidence in the vote preparation machine. This approach has the advantage that
it is easy to run independent tests to verify that the vote preparing machine is working
properly. The ideas of Benaloh’s work were used by the VoteBox [45, 39] and Helios [1]
voting systems (the latter is a remote Internet voting system).
Another approach to the cast-as-intended verification problem was proposed by Arau´jo
et al. [6]. They use a different verification approach in which the voter takes home a
random set of already casted ballots as a receipt, i.e. each voter verifies votes from other
voters and not her own vote.
In recent years there has been several proposals for E2E verifiable voting systems
by combining the code voting approach to an universal verifiable vote tally protocols
[44, 34, 30, 27].
Previously to this work, the “only usable way” to support complex ballots encryptions
in remote E2E voting systems was using the Benaloh approach.
Usually, to prove a valid vote encryption, the protocol designers use disjunctive proofs
of plaintext equality, e.g. in [2], or more elaborated proofs of structure of the plaintext
vote [28] which usually restrict its applications to specific types of complex ballots. How-
ever, none of these approaches allow a MarkPledge style direct vote encryption verifica-
tion.
3. Preliminaries
Our work relies on the independent generators assumption (Assumption 1), on the
ElGamal cryptosystem [25] and its homomorphic properties, on verifiable shuﬄes and
several zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. The setup for our constructions requires a
cyclic group Gq of prime order q, e.g. a subgroup of Z∗p, where p and q are large primes
such that q|p−1. We say that for any given set of generators (g1, ..., gm) and any element
y ∈ Gq, (x1, ..., xm) ∈ Zmq is a representation of y with respect to the gi’s if y =
∏m
i=1 g
xi
i .
Assumption 1. (independent generators assumption, see [18, 12]) No probabilis-
tic polynomial-time algorithm, on input q and a randomly chosen, polynomial-sized tuple
of generators (g1, ..., gm), can output with non-negligible probability an element h ∈ Gq
and two different representations of h with respect to some of the gi’s.
3.1. The ElGamal cryptosystem
The ElGamal cryptosystem operates over a cyclic group, e.g. Gq.
3 Let both primes
p, q and a generator g of Gq be the public parameters of the system. The ElGamal key
pair consists of a private key s and the corresponding public key h = gs mod p. The
private key s is a randomly chosen integer such that 0 < s < q. The ElGamal message
space is M = Gq, the ciphertext space is C = Gq x Gq and the encryption and decryption
algorithms are described below.
. The ElGamal encryption algorithm E is defined as follows:
r
R←− Z∗q , c = 〈α, β〉 = 〈gr mod p, hrm mod p〉 = Eh(m, r)
3It is also possible to setup the ElGamal cryptosystem over elliptic curves, but, for simplicity, the
description uses the setup over the large prime order cyclic group of integers Gq .
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. The ElGamal decryption algorithm D is defined as follows:
m =
β
αs
mod p = Ds(c)
In e-voting protocols it is usual to share the election private key among a set T of
trustees such that at the end of the election a subset of T must cooperate to decrypt
the votes. The details of distributed key generation and decryption algorithms for the
ElGamal cryptosystem can be found in [22, 11].
ElGamal homomorphic properties:. ElGamal is an homomorphic cryptosystem, i.e. there
are known algebraic operations performed on the ciphertexts that are equivalent to other
(possibly the same) algebraic operations performed on the plaintexts (messages).
. Multiplicative homomorphism
Eh(m1, r1)⊗ Eh(m2, r2) = 〈gr1 , hr1m1〉 ⊗ 〈gr2 , hr2m2〉
= 〈gr1gr2 , hr1m1hr2m2〉
= 〈gr1+r2 , hr1+r2m1m2〉
= Eh(m1m2 mod p, r1 + r2 mod q)
(1)
. Exponentiation homomorphism
Eh(m, r)n = 〈gr, hrm〉n = 〈(gr)n, (hrm)n〉
= 〈(gr)n, (hr)nmn〉 = 〈grn, hrnmn〉
= Eh(mn mod p, rn mod q)
(2)
The above described homomorphisms can be turned into additive and multiplicative
exponent homomorphisms when using exponential ElGamal [22]. In exponential ElGa-
mal the message space is M ′ = Zq, and the encryption operation requires the use of a
generator G of Gq (can be g). The exponential ElGamal encryption of a message m ∈M ′
is E(Gm, r) and the additive and multiplicative exponent homomorphisms are defined as
follows:
. Additive exponent homomorphism
Eh(Gm1 , r1)⊗ Eh(Gm2 , r2) = 〈gr1 , hr1Gm1〉 ⊗ 〈gr2 , hr2Gm2〉
= 〈gr1gr2 , hr1Gm1hr2Gm2〉
= 〈gr1+r2 , hr1+r2Gm1+m2〉
= Eh(Gm1+m2 mod q mod p, r1 + r2 mod q)
(3)
. Multiplicative exponent homomorphism
Eh(Gm, r)n = 〈gr, hrGm〉n = 〈(gr)n, (hrGm)n〉
= 〈(gr)n, (hr)n(Gm)n〉 = 〈grn, hrnGmn〉
= Eh(Gmn mod q mod p, rn mod q)
(4)
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3.2. Re-encryption, verifiable shuﬄes and mix nets
Given a ciphertext Eh(m, r) it is possible of obtain a different encryption of m simply
by applying a component-wise multiplication (⊗):
Eh(m, r)⊗ 〈gr′ , hr′〉 = 〈gr+r′ , hr+r′m〉 = Eh(m, r + r′)
A re-encryption shuﬄe inputs a set of ciphertexts C = C1, ..., CN and outputs a set of
ciphertexts C ′ = C ′1, ..., C
′
N with a permutation pi of the same plaintexts, i.e. a permuted
re-encryption of C. A verifiable re-encryption shuﬄe outputs a proof that C ′ contains a
permutation pi of the plaintexts in C, without revealing it.
A re-encryption mix net consists on a set of peers (called mixers) that perform indi-
vidual re-encryption shuﬄes in sequence. If at least one mixer is honest the final output
of the mix net will not reveal the link between the input ciphertexts and the output
ciphertexts. Examples of efficient shuﬄes/mix nets can be found in [47, 7].
3.3. Zero-knowledge proofs
To prove the correctness of a protocol it is usual to use zero-knowledge proofs. The
constructions proposed in this paper use the below described interactive (honest-verifier)
zero-knowledge proofs, which can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic [26].
3.3.1. Proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm
In the proof by Schnorr [46] the prover P proves to a verifier V that, for a given
message v and a generator g of Gq, she knows x such that α = g
x mod p.
ZKPK [x : α = gx]
The proof unfolds as follows:
Public input: g, α
P private input: x such that α = gx mod p
1. P chooses w R←− Zq and sends a = gw mod p to V.
2. V chooses c R←− Zq and sends it to P.
3. P sends r = (w + cx) mod q to V.
4. V verifies gr ≡ aαc mod p
3.3.2. Proof of knowledge of a representation
The Schnorr proof above can be generalized to provide a proof of knowledge of a rep-
resentation (x1, ..., xm) of a value α ∈ Gq, with respect to a set of generators (g1, ..., gm)
[10].
ZKPK
[
x1, ..., xm : α =
m∏
i=1
gxii
]
The proof unfolds as follows:
Public input: g, α
P private input: (x1, ..., xm) such that α =
∏m
i=1 g
xi
i mod p
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1. P chooses w1, ..., wm R←− Zq and sends a =
∏m
i=1 g
wi
i mod p to V.
2. V chooses c R←− Zq and sends it to P.
3. P sends ri = (wi + cxi) mod q to V.
4. V verifies ∏mi=1 grii ≡ aαc mod p
3.3.3. Proof of equality of two discrete logarithms
A proof that two discrete logarithms are equal can be achieved by executing in parallel
two zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of a discrete logarithm [19].
ZKPK
[
x : logg α = x ∧ logh β = x
]
which we can also represent in the more compact form:
ZKPK [x : α = gx ∧ β = hx]
The proof unfolds as follows: Public input: g, h, α, β
P private input: x such that α = gx mod p and β = hx mod p
1. P chooses w R←− Zq and sends a = gw mod p and b = hw mod p to V.
2. V chooses c R←− Zq and sends it to P.
3. P sends r = (w + cx) mod q to V.
4. V verifies gr ≡ aαc mod p ∧ hr ≡ bβc mod p
This proof can be used to prove that an ElGamal ciphertext c = 〈α, β〉 encrypts a
message m, i.e. ZKPK [x : α = gx ∧ β/m = hx].
3.3.4. Proof of knowledge of an ElGamal plaintext representation
Here we present a proof of knowledge of an ElGamal plaintext representation with
respect to a set of generators (g1, ..., gm) and a ciphertext c = 〈α, β〉.
ZKPK
[
x0, x1, ..., xm : α = g
x0 ∧ β/
m∏
i=1
gxii = h
x0
]
In our constructions description we will use the following shorter notation:
ZKPK
[
x0, x1, ..., xm : Eh
(
m∏
i=1
gxii , x0
)]
To our knowledge, such proof is not described in the literature, thus we proof it to be
special honest-verifier zero-knowledge [21], which suffices for our application. The proof
unfolds as follows:
Public input: g, h, α, β
P private input: x0, (x1, ..., xm) such that α = gx0 mod p and β = hx0
∏m
i=1 g
xi
i mod p.
1. P chooses w0, ..., wm R←− Zq and sends a = gw0 mod p, b = hw0
∏m
i=1 g
wi
i mod p
to V.
2. V chooses c R←− Zq and sends it to P.
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3. P sends r0, ..., rm : ri = (wi + cxi) mod q to V.
4. V verifies gr0 ≡ aαc mod p ∧ hr0∏mi=1 grii ≡ bβc mod p
Theorem 1. The above protocol is special honest-verifier zero-knowledge for proving
knowledge of an ElGamal plaintext representation (x∗1, ..., x
∗
m) of a value v ∈ Gq with
respect to a set of generators (g1, ..., gm).
Proof. The protocol is complete because if both P and V are honest it will always hold
that gr0 ≡ gw0+cx0 ≡ gw0gcx0 ≡ aαc mod p and that hr0∏mi=1 grii ≡ hw0+cx0∏mi=1 gwi+cxii ≡
hw0
∏m
i=1 g
wi
i h
cx0
∏m
i=1 g
cxi
i ≡ bβc mod p.
To prove soundness we show that if P can answer to two different challenges (c, c′)
it is able to compute values x∗i , such that v =
∏m
i=1 g
x∗i
i and Eh (v, x0) = 〈α, β〉, thus it
knows a representation of v with respect to the set of generators (g1, ..., gm).
If P can correctly answer to two different challenges, c and c′, then it knows that
x0 = (r0 − r′0)/(c − c′) mod q because gr0 = gw + gcx0 mod q and gr
′
0 = gw + gc
′x0
mod q. Additionally, the following also holds b = β−chr0
∏m
i=1 g
ri
i ≡ β−c
′
hr
′
0
∏m
i=1 g
r′i
i
mod p, thus h(r0−r
′
0)/(c−c′)∏m
i=1 g
(ri−r′i)/(c−c′)
i ≡ β ≡ hx0v mod p, which means that
(x∗1 = (r1− r′1)/(c− c′), ..., x∗m = (rm− r′m)/(c− c′)) is a representation of v with respect
to the set of generators (g1, ..., gm).
Note that if P knows the values w1, ..., wm and the correct answer to single a challenge
c it can directly compute suitable values x0 = (r0 − w0)/c and x∗i = (ri − wi)/c.
Finally, we show how to build a simulator S. To simulate a conversation S chooses
c and w0, ..., wm at random. Then it sets a = g
w0α−c mod p, b = hw0
∏m
i=1 g
wi
i β
−c
mod p and ri = wi which completes the simulated conversation. Since c and w0, ..., wm
are chosen freely we obtain special honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
3.3.5. Disjunctive proof of ElGamal plaintext equality
A disjunctive proof of ElGamal plaintext equality can be obtained from [21, 22]. The
proof described below allows to prove that a given ElGamal ciphertext Eh (mi, x) = 〈α, β〉
encrypts a message mi in {m1, ...,mN} : ∀j∈[1,N ], mj ∈ Gq, without revealing which one
it is.
ZKPK [x,mi : Eh (mi, x) = Eh (m0, x) ∨ ... ∨ Eh (mi, x) = Eh (mN , x)]
The proof unfolds as follows:
Public input: g, h, α, β, {m1, ...,mN}
P private input: mi ∈ {m1, ...,mN}, x such that α = gx mod p and β = hxmi mod p
1. P
(a) chooses ∀j∈[1,N ]∧ j 6=i cj , rj R←− Zq and computes aj = grj/αcj mod p, bj =
hrj/(β/mj)
ci mod p.
(b) chooses w
R←− Zq and computes ai = gw mod p and bi = hw mod p.
(c) sends (a1, b1, ..., aN , bN ) to V.
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2. V chooses c R←− Zq and sends it to P.
3. P computes ci = c−
∑
j 6=i cj mod q and ri = w+xci mod q and sends (c1, r1, ..., cN , rN )
to V.
4. V verifies c = ∑Nj=1 cj ∧ ∀j∈[1,N ] grj ≡ ajαcj mod p ∧ hrj ≡ bj(β/mj)cj mod p
3.3.6. Proof of inequality of two discrete logarithms
The inequality of two discrete logarithms (logg α 6= logh β) can be proven using the
following protocol by Camenisch and Shoup [13]:
ZKPK
[
x : α = gx ∧ logg α 6= logh β
]
The proof unfolds as follows: Public input: g, h, α, β
P private input: x such that α = gx mod p
1. P chooses r R←− Zq and sends C = (hx/β)r = hxr(1/β)r = hω(1/β)σ mod p = to
V.
2. P performs a ZKPK [ω, σ : C = hω(1/β)σ ∧ 1 = gω(1/α)σ]
(a) P chooses sω, sσ R←− Zq and sends tc = hsω (1/β)sσ mod p, t1 = gsω (1/α)sσ
mod p to V.
(b) V chooses c R←− Zq and sends it to P.
(c) P sends rω = ωc+ sω mod q and rσ = σc+ sσ mod q to V.
3. V accepts the proof if C 6= 1 ∧ hrω (1/β)rσ ≡ Cctc mod p ∧ grω (1/α)rσ ≡ t1
mod p.
This proof is used in our constructions to prove that an ElGamal ciphertext c = 〈α, β〉
is not an encryption of the value 1.
4. Verifiable vote encryption constructions for mix net tallying
In this section we describe our new constructions for a verifiable vote encryption that
supports mix net tallying. Our constructions have three steps: i) first, we perform an
initial private and verifiable shuﬄe of the candidates/options identifiers encryptions; then
ii) we use the anonymized encryptions to create the final vote encryption; and finally,
iii) we provide ZKPK for any additional “structural” vote constrains. The initial shuﬄe
allow us to prove that a vote is well formed based on the structure of the vote encryption
(i.e. the organization of the shuﬄed ciphertexts) instead proving the message structure
inside a ciphertext.
We start by describing the construction for the simpler 1-out-of-n approval voting.
Then, we show how to generalize it to k-out-of-n approval, weighted and ranked voting.
To keep the description as generic as possible, we assume that the vote is encrypted by
a vote machine M, which can be a dedicated vote machine at the polling station or the
voter’s computer in case of Internet Voting.
At the end of each construction we give an extra output definition (V ′) that will be
used in the cast-as-intended verification protocol described in section 6. V ′ will be a
single encryption that represents the voter’s selection(s). For every ZKPK used in this
section the reader should consider the non-interactive version.
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4.1. Approval voting
The simpler vote structure is selecting 1-out-of-n options (candidates). In this sce-
nario we have the following public election setup: p, q, g are the ElGamal parameters, h is
the public key of the election, and IG = {g1, ..., gn} is a set of n independent generators
of Gq.
4 Each generator gi ∈ IG is assigned to the corresponding option i. Consider also
C = C1, ..., Cn = Eh(g1, 0), ..., Eh(gn, 0), a set of trivial encryptions of all the generators
in IG.
To create a vote encryption the vote machine M engages in the following protocol
with voter V.
1. V selects one option by sending the corresponding index 1 ≤ s ≤ n to M.
2. M creates a verifiable shuﬄe C ′ = C ′1, ..., C ′n of C and the corresponding proof of
correctness Ppi.
5
The element of C ′ that corresponds to the element Ci ∈ C is denoted by C ′pi(i) =
Ci ⊗ Eh(1, ρi) = Eh(gi, ρi), where pi is the permutation used in the shuﬄe and ρi is
the corresponding randomizer.
3. M sets V = C ′pi(s), i.e. the vote encryption V is set to the encryption C ′pi(s) ∈ C ′
that encrypts gs.
6
4. M outputs the complete vote encryption V ∗ = {C ′, Ppi, V }
Assuming a private and sound shuﬄe, it is easy to verify the well formedness of the
vote encryption V because it is one of the shuﬄed ciphertexts, thus it must encrypt a
valid option identifier. Given that the shuﬄe is private no information about the chosen
option/candidate is revealed. The mix net based tally takes as input V .
For the cast-as-intended verification protocol, refer to section 6, in the case of 1-out-
of-n votes we define V ′ = V = C ′pi(s) = Eh(gs, ρs) as the single encryption that represents
the voter’s selection.
4.1.1. Approving k-out-of-n options
The k-out-of-n approval vote protocol can be easily extended from the 1-out-of-n
protocol as follows:
1. V selects k options by sending the corresponding set of indexes S = s1, ..., sk toM.
2. M creates a verifiable shuﬄe C ′ = C ′1, ..., C ′n of C and the corresponding proof of
correctness Ppi.
3. M sets V = V1, ..., Vk = C ′pi(s1), ..., C ′pi(sk), i.e. the vote V is defined as the set of
encryptions which encrypt the corresponding gsl ’s.
4. M outputs the complete vote encryption V ∗ = {C ′, Ppi, V }
Like in the 1-out-of-n protocol, the private verifiable shuﬄe ensures that no information
about the values encrypted in V are leaked. Additionally, it is easy to verify that exactly
k options were selected.
4The generators in IG are also independent of the ElGamal parameter g.
5Note that steps 1 and 2 can be swapped.
6V can also be identified by the index pi(s).
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For the case of k-out-of-n votes we define V ′ = V1⊗V2⊗...⊗Vk = Eh(
∏
sl∈S gsl ,
∑
sl∈S ρsl)
as the single encryption that represents the voter’s selection.
The mix net based tally takes as input V . If the decryption of V ′ is “easy” (“low”
number of possible plaintexts in V ′) and there is no privacy issue in decrypting the vote
“aggregation”, V ′ can be used directly in the mix net tally.
4.1.2. Approving [kmin, kmax]-out-of-n options
When the voter can choose between kmin to kmax options and there is no privacy
issues in knowing how many options the voter has selected we can use the k-out-of-n
protocol because everyone can easily verify that kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax. However, if revealing
the exact number of selected options is a problem we need a different protocol, one that
hides the value of k. To address this issue we propose the following vote construction:
1. V selects k options by sending the corresponding set of indexes S = s1, ..., sk toM.
2. M creates a verifiable shuﬄe C ′ = C ′1, ..., C ′n, C ′δ1 , ..., C ′δkmax−kmin of C ‖ Cδ and
the corresponding proof of correctness Ppi. The δi indexes are defined as δi = n+ i.
Let Cδ = Cδ1 , ..., Cδkmax−kmin : ∀i∈[1,kmax−kmin] Cδi = Eh(1, 0). Thus, C ′ contains
kmax − kmin encryptions of the value 1.
3. M sets V = V1, ..., Vkmax = C ′pi(s1), ..., C ′pi(sk)
⋃kmax−k
m=1 C
′
pi(δm)
, i.e. the vote V is
defined as a set of kmax encryptions containing the k selections of the voter and
kmax − k encryptions of the value 1.
4. M outputs the complete vote encryption V ∗ = {C ′, Ppi, V }
The above protocol hides the number of selections because V is of constant size, namely
kmax encryptions, thus there is nothing that reveals the number of selections made by
the voter, i.e. the size of S.
As in the previous protocols, the private verifiable shuﬄe ensures that no information
about the values encrypted in V are leaked. Additionally, it is easy to verify that kmin ≤
k ≤ kmax options were selected. In this protocol V ′ is defined as V ′ = V1 ⊗ V2 ⊗ ... ⊗
Vkmax = Eh(
∏
sl∈S gsl ,
∑
sl∈S ρsl +
∑kmax−k
m=1 ρδm).
The mix net based tally takes as input V or V ′, as in the k-out-of-n protocol.
4.2. Ranked voting
There are many scenarios in which a voter is requested to order a set of options. Next
we describe our construction for a verifiable [kmin, kmax]-out-of-n ranked vote and then
we explain how to transform it for the simpler k-out-of-n ranked vote.
1. V selects kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax options by sending the corresponding ordered set of
indexes S = s1, ..., sk to M.
2. M creates a verifiable shuﬄe C ′ = C ′1, ..., C ′n, C ′δ1 , ..., C ′δkmax−kmin of C ‖ Cδ and
the corresponding proof of correctness Ppi. The δi indexes are defined as δi = n+ i.
Let Cδ = Cδ1 , ..., Cδkmax−kmin : ∀i∈[1,kmax−kmin] Cδi = Eh(1, 0). Thus, C ′ contains
kmax − kmin encryptions of the value 1.
3. M sets V = V1, ..., Vkmax = C ′pi(s1), ..., C ′pi(sk)
⋃kmax−k
m=1 C
′
pi(δm
), i.e. the vote V is
defined as the ordered set of kmax encryptions containing the k selections of the
voter and kmax − k encryptions of the value 1. Note that the order of the indexes
in S is preserved in V .
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4. M sets Pkmin =
⋃kmin
i=1 ZKPK
[
xi : αi = g
xi ∧ logg αi 6= logh βi
]
: Vi = 〈αi, βi〉.
Pkmin is the set of ZKPKs which prove that no Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ kmin, is an encryption
of the value 1, i.e. it proves that all ranks form 1 to kmin where assigned to some
options.
5. M sets
Pcontinuous =
⋃kmax−1
i=kmin+1
ZKPK[xi, x
∗ : (αi = gxi ∧ logg αi 6= logh βi) ∨ (α∗i =
gx
∗ ∧ β∗i = hx
∗
)] : Vi = 〈αi, βi〉 ∧ V ∗i = Vi+1 ⊗ ...⊗ Vkmax = 〈α∗i , β∗i 〉.
The Pcontinuous is a set of ZKPK proofs that can be easily constructed from the
proofs of inequality and equality of discrete logarithms using the techniques from
[21]. The proofs prove for each i ∈ [kmin + 1, kmax − 1] that Vi does not encrypt
the value 1 or that all Vj : j > i encrypt the value 1, i.e. it guarantees that a rank
j cannot be given to an option if there is a rank i : i < j that was not assigned.
6. M outputs the complete vote encryption V ∗ = {C ′, P = Ppi∪Pkmin∪Pcontinuous, V }
Once again the voter selections are hidden by the private shuﬄe and the ZKPKs, which
also guarantee the construction of a valid vote. If it’s not desirable or possible to break
the vote in the tally process, e.g. when tallying using the STV method, then a mix net
that can shuﬄe sets of ordered ciphertexts must be used, otherwise kmax mix nets can
be used (one for each rank) or a single one with inputs (Vi)
i instead of Vi.
For this type of vote we define V ′ = (V1)1⊗(V2)2⊗...⊗(Vkmax)kmax = Eh(
∏
sl∈S g
l
sl
,
∑
sl∈S lρsl+∑kmax−k
m=1 (m+ k)ρδm).
In the case of k-out-of-n ranked votes the protocol is simplified as follows:
(a) Cδ is removed from the shuﬄe in step 2.
(b) There are exactly k encryptions in V , accordingly to the voter’s order of preference.
(c) The Pkmin (step 4) and Pcontinuous (step 5) proofs are removed from the protocol.
4.3. Weighted voting
There are scenarios, e.g. the elections in Luxembourg and in some parts of Germany
[23, 24], which require the ability to weight votes, i.e. the voter has the right to cast k
votes and can give up to t votes to each candidate. The ranked voting protocol can be
easily extended to support weight voting by including a variable weight factor instead
of fixed rank (“fixed weight”). However, that solution would leak a vote pattern just by
looking at the vote ciphertexts in V , which could compromise the voter’s privacy.
To prevent the vote pattern leakage from the ciphertexts in V we propose a different
approach based on the previous k-out-of-n and [kmin, kmax]-out-of-n protocols. Next we
describe the protocol for the case in which the voter casts a bounded number of votes
kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax and after the simplification that can be performed for the case in which
the voter must use all k votes.
1. V selects k options by sending the corresponding set of indexes S = si1,z11 , ..., sik,zkk
to M. An index sil,zll represents the choice of candidate il and 0 ≤ zl < t allows
to choose up to t different indexes for the same candidate.
2. M creates a verifiable shuﬄe C ′ = C ′1, ..., C ′tn, C ′δ1 , ..., C ′δkmax−kmin ) of C
t ‖ Cδ and
the corresponding proof of correctness Ppi. The δi indexes are defined as δi = tn+i.
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Ct represents t times the encryptions in C, thus V can choose the same option up
to t times. For a given candidate i, the corresponding generator gi is encrypted in
the indexes i, i+ n, ..., i+ n(t− 1), thus we define C ′
pi(s
il,zl
l )
= Eh(gil , ρil+nzl).
Cδ is defined as Cδ = Cδ1 , ..., Cδkmax−kmin : ∀i∈[1,kmax−kmin] Cδi = Eh(1, 0). Thus,
C ′ contains kmax − kmin encryptions of the value 1 and t times the encryptions of
each candidate identifier.
3. M sets V = V1, ..., Vkmax = C ′pi(si1,z11 ), ..., C
′
pi(s
ik,zk
k )
⋃kmax−k
m=1 C
′
pi(δm)
, i.e. the vote V
is defined as a set of kmax encryptions containing the k selections of the voter and
kmax − k encryptions of the value 1.
4. M outputs the complete vote encryption V ∗ = {C ′, Ppi, V }
The above protocol hides the number of selections because V is of constant size, namely
kmax encryptions, thus there is nothing that reveals the number of selections made by
the voter, i.e. the size of S. Additionally, the shuﬄe input limits to t the number of
selections that a voter can make in any candidate.
As in the previous protocols, the private verifiable shuﬄe ensures that no information
about the values encrypted in V are leaked. Additionally, it is easy to verify that kmin ≤
k ≤ kmax options were selected.
In this protocol V ′ is defined as V ′ = V1⊗V2⊗...⊗Vkmax = Eh(
∏
s
il,zl
l ∈S
gil ,
∑
s
il,zl
l ∈S
ρil+nzl+∑kmax−k
m=1 ρδm).
The protocol for the case in which k is a constant is very similar to the above described
protocol. The only differences are: i) Cδ is removed form C
′
pi in step 2 and, consequently,
ii) there are exactly k encryptions in V , all of them encrypting a candidate identifier,
step 3.
The mix net based tally is similar to the previously described protocols.
5. Verifiable vote constructions for homomorphic vote tallying
Enabling homomorphic vote tallying has the advantages of hiding the individual vote
structure, by revealing only the election totals, and enables a faster vote count process.
However, enabling homomorphic vote tallying has a cost, the cost of creating one homo-
morphic counter for each option in the vote encryption and assuring that the votes are
summed in the correct homomorphic counters.
We start by describing the construction for approval voting and then we describe the
constructions for weighted and ranked voting. Like in the previous section, the reader
should consider the non-interactive version of the ZKPKs.
5.1. Approving [kmin, kmax]-out-of-n options
We start by describing the protocol for the simpler case, i.e. kmin = 0. Then we
describe the additions necessary to support kmin = 1, kmin = k = kmax and the general
case kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax. Recall that the election setup defines a set of independent genera-
tors IG = {g1, ..., gn}, one for each option i, and C = C1, ..., Cn = Eh(g1, 0), ..., Eh(gn, 0),
a set of trivial encryptions of all the generators in IG. The protocol for approving
[0, kmax]-out-of-n options unfolds as follows:
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1. V selects 0 ≤ k ≤ kmax options by sending the corresponding set of indexes S =
s1, ..., sk to M.
2. Let CH be a list of kmax trivial encryptions of the value 1, i.e. Eh(1, 0). M creates a
verifiable shuﬄe C ′ = C ′1, ..., C
′
n, C
′
H1
, ..., C ′Hkmax of C ‖ CH and the corresponding
proof of correctness Ppi, where the index Hi is defined as Hi = n+ i.
3. M sets V = V1, ..., Vkmax = C ′pi(s1), ..., C ′pi(sk)
⋃kmax−k
m=1 C
′
pi(Hm)
, i.e. the vote V is
defined as the set of kmax encryptions containing the k selections of the voter and
kmax − k encryptions of the value 1.
4. M sets one “homomorphic” vote VHi to each option i. ∀i/∈S : VHi = C ′pi(i) =
Eh(gi, ρi) and ∀i=sl∈S : VHi = C ′pi(Hkmax−k+l) = Eh(1, ρn+kmax−k+l). We denote the
list of assignments by VH .
In other words, VHi for the not selected candidates is the encryption of the corre-
sponding generator gi and for the selected candidates is the encryption of the value
1.
5. M computes a set of n non interactive zero-knowledge proofs PH = PH1 , ..., PHn
such that:
PHi = ZKPK [zi, xi : VHi = Eh(gxii , zi)]
The proof PHi is a proof of knowledge of an ElGamal plaintext representation to
the generator gi. Under the independent generators assumption, and the set of
available encryptions (C ′), the proof PHi can only be accepted if VHi encrypts gi
or the value 1 = g0i . Here the encryption of 1 represents the selection of the option.
6. M outputs the complete vote encryption V ∗ = {C ′, P = Ppi ∪ PH , V, VH}
At the end of the election, the homomorphic tallying can be performed using the ⊗
operator to accumulate the individual homomorphic votes into n homomorphic counters.
The decryption of the homomorphic counter of option i will reveal the value gN−vii , where
N is the total number of votes accumulated and vi is the number of votes received by
option i.
The private verifiable shuﬄe prevents the leakage of the voter’s preferences and guar-
antees that: i) no more than k votes can be cast, and ii) no candidate gets more than
one vote.
For this protocol we define V ′ = V1 ⊗ V2 ⊗ ... ⊗ Vkmax = Eh(
∏
sl∈S gsl ,
∑
sl∈S ρsl +∑kmax−k
m=1 ρHm)).
Case kmin = 1. . When kmin = 1 it is necessary to prove that at least one option was
selected, i.e. proof that one Vi = 〈α, β〉 encrypts a value different than 1, which can be
performed with the proof of inequality of two discrete logarithms:
P6=1 = ZKPK
[
x : α = gx ∧ logg α 6= logh β
]
The proof P6=1 must be added to P in step 6 and can be performed on any Vi, e.g.
V1.
Case kmin = k = kmax.. When kmin = kmax it is necessary to prove that all elements
of V encrypt a generator, i.e. every element of V selects one option. To prove the above
in an efficient way we redefine CH to be a list of k trivial encryptions of the value gv,
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i.e. E(gv, 0). gv is an additional independent generator, thus gv /∈ IG. The remainder
of the protocol is unaltered. With this change it is possible to prove that all k votes,
the k encryptions of gv, were assigned to an option by verifying that no element of V
encrypts the value gv. The efficient way to do this is to publish a proof of knowledge of
the ElGamal plaintext representation of V ′ in order to the set of generators IG.
PK = ZKPK
[
x0, x1, ..., xn : V
′ = Eh
(
n∏
i=1
gxii , x0
)]
Given that gv /∈ IG, PK proves that all k votes were assigned to a valid option. The
proof PK must be added to P in step 6. Note that now the homomorphic counters
decryption outputs gN−vii g
vi
v .
The general case kmin ≤ k ≤ kmax.. If we are not in any of the special cases described
above, the proof of vote well-formed is more complex. Here we require the use of gv as
in the previous case. In the general case, V can contain up to kmax − kmin encryptions
of gv. To prove that the vote is well-formed, M publishes the additional data:
Vgv = Eh(gkmax−kv , r)
Pgv = ZKPK
[
r, k : Vgv = Eh
(
g0v , r
) ∨ ... ∨ Vgv = Eh (gkmax−kminv , r)]
V ′ = V1 ⊗ V2 ⊗ ...⊗ Vkmax ⊗ V −1gv = Eh
(∏
sl∈S
gsl ,−r +
∑
sl∈S
ρsl +
kmax−k∑
m=1
ρHm
)
PK = ZKPK
[
x0, x1, ..., xn : V
′ = Eh
(
n∏
i=1
gxii , x0
)]
The proofs Pgv and PK prove that there is a valid number of encryption of gv in V and
must be added to P in step 6.
5.2. Weighted voting
In this section we describe the protocol to distribute k ∈ [0, kmax] votes by n options,
where it is possible to weight each option up to t. For the other different cases of bounds
on k we can apply directly the techniques described in section 5.1. Let ti represent the
weight given to option i.
1. V selects k options by sending the corresponding set of indexes S = si1,z11 , ..., sik,zkk
to M. An index sil,zll represents the choice of candidate il and 0 ≤ zl < t allows
to choose up to t different indexes for the same candidate.
2. Let CH = CH1 , ..., CHmax be a list of kmax trivial encryptions of the value 1, i.e.
Eh(1, 0). M creates a verifiable shuﬄe C ′ = C ′1, ..., C ′tn, C ′H1 , ..., C ′Hmax of Ct ‖ CH
and the corresponding proof of correctness Ppi. The Hi indexes are defined as
Hi = tn+ i.
Ct represents t times the encryptions in C, thus V can choose the same option up
to t times. For a given candidate i, the corresponding generator gi is encrypted in
the indexes i, i+ n, ..., i+ n(t− 1), thus we define C ′
pi(s
il,zl
l )
= Eh(gil , ρil+nzl).
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3. M sets V = V1, ..., Vkmax = C ′pi(si1,z11 ), ..., C
′
pi(s
ik,zk
k )
⋃kmax−k
m=1 C
′
pi(Hm)
, i.e. the vote
V is defined as a set of kmax encryptions containing the k selections of the voter
and kmax − k encryptions of the value 1.
4. M creates a vote table T of size n by t. The Ti row in T is the row of option i.
Then,M assigns to each position Tij an element of C ′\V such that row Ti contains
ti encryptions of the value 1 and t− ti encryptions of gi. The “homomorphic” vote
definition is now VHi = Ti1 ⊗ ...⊗ Tit, i.e. VHi encrypts the value gt−tii . VH is now
defined as VH = T .
5. M computes a set of n non interactive zero-knowledge proofs PH = PH1 , ..., PHn
such that:
PHi = ZKPK [zi, xi : VHi = Eh(gxii , zi)]
The proof PHi is a proof of knowledge of an ElGamal plaintext representation to
the generator gi. Under the independent generators assumption, and the set of
available encryptions (C ′), the proof PHi can only be accepted if VHi encrypts a
valid power of gi or the value 1 = g
0
i .
6. M outputs the complete vote encryption V ∗ = {C ′, P = Ppi ∪ PH , V, VH}
The homomorphic tally is performed as in the approval vote case, see section 5.1. Once
again it is easy to check, without revealing the voter’s choices, that no candidate can
have more than t votes and that the overall sum of votes cannot exceed kmax. For this
protocol, V ′ is defined as V ′ = V1⊗V2⊗ ...⊗Vkmax = Eh(
∏
s
il,zl
l ∈S
gil ,
∑
s
il,zl
l ∈S
ρil+nzl +∑kmax−k
m=1 ρHm).
5.3. Ranked voting
Unfortunately, due to the ordering of the candidates the internal structure of a ranked
vote is more complex than the structure of the approval or weighted votes. To deal with
the additional complexity we have to use a more elaborated proof of vote well-formness.
Note that the feasibility of an homomorphic tally of ranked votes highly depends on
the tally method. Our vote construction is specially suited for Borda like tally methods
but it is not enough to deal with more elaborated tally methods such as IRV/STV or
Condorced.
Below we give the details of our protocol for ranking k-out-of-n candidates. For other
different cases of bounds on k we can apply the techniques described in sections 4.2 and
5.1.
1. V selects k options by sending the corresponding ordered set of indexes S = s1, ..., sk
to M.
2. M creates k verifiable shuﬄes C ′∗ = C ′1, ..., C ′k, where C ′i = C ′i1 , ..., C ′in+1 is the
shuﬄe of C ‖ Eh(gv, 0), where gv is an additional independent generator such that
gv /∈ IG. Ppi = Ppi1 , ..., Ppik represents the corresponding proofs of correctness. In
the protocol, only the encryptions of the shuﬄe C ′i can be used to give the ith
rank.
3. M sets V = V1, ..., Vk = C ′1pi(s1), ..., C
′k
pi(sk)
. V is defined as the ordered set of k
encryptions containing the k selections of the voter such that C
′i
pi(si)
= Eh(gsi , ρ′isi).
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Additionally, M creates:
PK = ZKPK
[
x0, x1, ..., xn : V
′ = Eh
(
n∏
i=1
gxii , x0
)]
4. M creates the shuﬄe C ′k+1 of V ⋃n−ki=1 Eh(gv, 0), i.e. the shuﬄe of the union of
the k encryptions in V with n − k encryptions of the value gv. It also creates the
corresponding proof of correctness Ppik+1 .
Then M creates a vote table T of size n by k + 1. The Ti row in T is the row
of option i. Then, M assigns to each position Ti,j an element of C ′j\Vj ,7 such
that each row Ti contains one encryption of the value gv and k encryptions of gi.
The encryption of the value gv on the column j 6= k + 1 represents the ranking of
candidate i with rank j. If the value gv appears on cell Ti,k+1 it means that no
rank was given to candidate i.
Let VHi = Ti,1 ⊗ ...⊗ Ti,k+1 and VH = T .
5. Let VHi = 〈αi, βi〉. M computes a set of n non interactive zero-knowledge proofs
PH = PH1 , ..., PHn such that:
PHi = ZKPK
[
xi : αi = g
xi ∧ βi/(gki gv) = hxi
]
6. M outputs the complete vote encryption V ∗ = {C ′∗, C ′k+1, P = Ppi∪Ppik+1∪PK ∪
PH , V, VH}
In this protocol the proof that the vote is well formed is constructed from the proofs Ppi,
Ppik+1, PK and PH . Given that gv /∈ IG, PK proves that all k votes were assigned to a
valid option. Ppi guarantees that a rank j cannot be assigned to more than one candidate
(there is only one encryption of the value gv). The proofs Ppik+1 and PH prove that no
more than one rank can be assigned to any candidate.
The homomorphic tally for Borda like tally methods is similar to the approval vote
case, see section 5.1, but now the homomorphic counters are defined on each Ti,j instead
of each VHi . For the homomorphic ranked vote construction V
′ is defined as:
V ′ = (V1)1 ⊗ (V2)2 ⊗ ...⊗ (Vk)k = Eh(
∏
sl∈S
glsl ,
∑
sl∈S
lρ′lsl)
6. Cast-as-intended verification of complex ballots
In this section we show how to extract a voter verifiable receipt from a complex ballot
encryption. The receipt verification requires the computation of some modular operations
computed on public data and on some private voter’s input. With this technique it is also
possible to have a single verification code for an entire multi race ballot. In section 6.2 we
explain how a “more traditional” receipt with one verification code for each option can
be obtained from our voter verifiable vote encryption constructions. This later receipt
can be quite long in the more complex scenarios, but it can be verified by the voter with
simple string matches.
7Note that C′k+1\Vk+1 = C′k+1 because there is no element Vk+1.
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6.1. A single verification code for complex ballots
The protocol betweenM and the voter V to create a cast-as-intended voter verifiable
vote verification code runs after the creation of the vote encryption V ∗, thus the voter
knows V ′, the set of selected candidates S∗ = s∗1, ..., s
∗
k and the ranks or weights given
to each candidate t∗1, ..., t
∗
n. ∀k/∈S∗ t∗k = 0 and in the case of approval voting each selected
candidate i has t∗i = 1).
Accordingly to the protocols in sections 4 and 5, it is expected that V ′ = Eh(
∏k
i=1 g
t∗i
s∗i
, rv)
for some randomness rv known to M. M now proves to V that it has encrypted the
voter’s selections by running a slightly modified version of the protocol described in sec-
tion 3.3.4, in which it reveals some additional information to V. The proof unfolds as
follows:
Public input: g, h, V ′ = 〈α, β〉
M private input: rv = x0, (x1, ..., xn) such that α = gx0 mod p and β = hx0
∏n
i=1 g
xi
i
mod p.
1. M chooses w0, ..., wn R←− Zq, computes σ =
∏n
i=1 g
wi
i mod p and sends a = g
w0
mod p, b = hw0σ mod p to V.
2. M commits to the vote by sending the verification code σ to V.
3. V chooses c R←− Zq and sends it to M.
4. M sends r0, ..., rn : ri = (wi + cxi) mod q to V.
5. M sends the vote V ∗ and the vote receipt a, b, c, r0, ..., rn to a PBB (public bulletin
board).
6. PBB publishes V ∗, a, b, c, r0, ..., rn iif
gr0 ≡ aαc mod p ∧ hr0
m∏
i=1
grii ≡ bβc mod p
Note that V ′ = 〈α, β〉 is easily computable from V ∗.
7. V verifies that her vote/receipt information was correctly published in the PBB
and that σ =
∏n
i=1 g
ri−t∗i c
i mod p.
Given the construction of V ∗, which is based on the verifiable shuﬄe of known plaintext
encryptions we already have a proof that M knows the contents of V ′, thus the above
protocol is just to enable the construction of a voter verifiable receipt, which should not
reveal the voter’s selections. To prove that the vote receipt does not reveal the voter’s
vote we prove that the above protocol is a special honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof
of a representation of the plaintext in V ′, thus it does not reveal the voter’s vote. Then
we will argue about the soundness of the voter’s receipt verification.
Theorem 2. The above protocol is special honest-verifier zero-knowledge for proving
knowledge of a representation (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) of a value v ∈ Gq, with respect to a set of
generators (g1, ..., gn), such that V
′ = Eh (v, x0).
Proof. The protocol is complete because if both M and V are honest the equations
is steps 6 and 7 will always hold. The correctness (proof of knowledge) of this protocol
follows immediately from the underlying protocol described in section 3.3.4, which output
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is a subset of the output of the present protocol. Thus, the same process can be used to
obtain a representation of v with respect to the set of generators (g1, ..., gn).
Finally, we show how to build a simulator S. To simulate a conversation S chooses
c and w0, ..., wn at random. Then, it sets a = g
w0α−c mod p, b = hw0
∏n
i=1 g
wi
i β
−c
mod p and ri = wi. Finally, the simulator creates σ =
∏n
i=1 g
ri−t′ic
i mod p for the
simulated candidate rank/weight set (i.e. vote) t′1, ..., t
′
n. Since c and w0, ..., wm are
chosen freely we obtain special honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
The soundness of the voter verification relies on the assumption that the data published
in the PBB is correct. Given that anyone can verify the correctness of the published
data, we assume that the voter is verifying the correct PBB entry. We also assume
that under the independent generators assumption, Assumption 1, M only knows one
representation with respect to the set of generators IG = {g1, ..., gn} of σ and of the
plaintexts encrypted in W , V ′ and of the value
∏m
i=1 g
ri
i mod p.
Under our assumptions, the above protocol guarantees that: i) removing one of the
voter’s selections implies that there will be one rj = wj : j ∈ S∗; ii) adding one more
selection i with rank/weight t′i implies that there will be one ri = wi + t
′
ic : i /∈ S∗; and
iii) replacing one of the voter’s selections implies that there will be one rj = wj : j ∈ S∗
and one ri = wi + t
′
ic : i /∈ S∗. Consequently, i) removing one selection implies that, in
the computation of σ, M uses w′j = wj + t∗jc; ii) adding on selection implies the use of
w′i = wi − t′ic; and ii) replacing one selection would imply both. Thus, assuming that V
selects a random challenge c,M has only a negligible probability of successfully changing
the voter’s vote without being detected, i.e. the probability of M guessing the random
challenge c issued by V.
6.1.1. Support for multi-race ballots
The extension of the single verification code to a multi-race / multi-questions ballot
is very simple and requires only a few tweaks. The protocol follows the steps of the
previously described protocol with the following tweaks:
1. The multi-race ballot setup has a global set of independent generators I∗G = I1G ∪
... ∪ IyG for all the y races in the ballot. The set of generators IiG is the set of
generators needed for race i.
2. The proof is made for a “global” vote V ′∗ = V ′1 ⊗ ... ⊗ V ′y , where V ′i is the V ′
encryption computed for race i.
6.1.2. Usability considerations
In this paper we do not attempt to give a full voting protocol but we have identified
some usability issues that should be addressed in future work that uses the described
techniques.
The use of a single verification code to verify that a vote is cast-as-intended implies
that the voter is somehow able to perform modular arithmetic. Of course the voter
cannot do it by itself and will need the help of a modular arithmetic calculator. The
good thing is that the needed computation is all on public data, i.e. the data published
in the PBB and on one set of valid vote selections.
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Note that only the voter knows which really was her set of selections S∗, the ranks/weights
given to each candidate t∗1, ..., t
∗
n and the σ value given by M. Thus, using a calculator
(e.g. a dedicated hardware or an application running on a mobile phone/tablet or com-
puter) does not provide any proof about the real contents of the vote to the calculator.
In fact, anyone can try any possible vote combination on any vote published in the PBB,
but only the voter can verify that the vote was cast-as-intended because only she knows
her set of selections S∗, the ranks/weights given to each candidate t∗1, ..., t
∗
n and the σ
value given by M.
It is also important to consider the fact that the voter must input her selections S
into the calculator, thus for complex ballots it is important to evaluate if the voter can
effectively replicate her choices in the both M and in the calculator.
In the cases where the number of vote possibilities is small, the receipt can contain
all possible σi values, one for each of the i vote possibilities. In this scenario the voter
just has to perform a simple string match, i.e. there is no need for an auxiliary calculator
because anyone can verify that the data published in the PBB, and therefore the σi
values on the receipt, is correct.
Another important aspect of usability are the sizes of the challenge c and of σ, which
as described are respectively of size log2 q and log2 p bits. Reducing the size of the
challenge reduces the voter’s verification soundness because as explained in section 6.1,
M can create a fake proof if it is able to guess the challenge value c. The honest-verifier
zero-knowledge property of the protocol remains unchanged because the values w0, ..., wn
are still chosen randomly from Zq, which makes the output of the proofs random in the
corresponding domains. Assuming now that the distribution of the elements of Gq is
uniform in Z∗p, V could verify only m bits of the σ value while keeping a verification
soundness linear to 1− 2m.
6.2. Creating a receipt with one verification code per option/candidate
There are some scenarios, e.g. poll station voting, in which for anti-coercion reasons
the voter should not end the voting process knowing only one σ value or in which, for
dispute resolution, the receipt must be immediately verified by the voter without the help
of electronic equipment. In these scenarios, a more “traditional” vote receipt with one
verification code for each option/candidate is more appropriate for a human verification.
The protocol described in section 6.1 allows to create such receipt easily because the
receipt already contains one verification code for each option/candidate i, the ri value.
For the cases of k-out-of-n approval votes the verification procedure is trivial, i.e.
the voter must check that k individual verification codes match her selections. In this
scenario, M must reveal the k individual verification codes ws∗l : ∀s∗l ∈ S∗, instead of σ
in step 2 of the protocol. M adds to the receipt the values r′i = ri − c. Then, the voter
can check that every individual verification code revealed to her match the corresponding
r′i value on the receipt by doing simple k string matches.
For the [kmin, kmax]-out-of-n approval votes it is necessary to adapt the vote con-
struction to avoid having to verify n codes. The idea here is to add kmax− kmin dummy
options/candidates. In this way the not used votes will go to the dummy candidates and,
therefore, the voter can easily verify that her not used votes did not went to some valid
candidate.
The verification of ranked or weighted votes is more tricky because it is necessary to
guarantee that the candidates get the correct rank/weight. One possible solution for this
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problem is to have, per candidate, one verification code for each possible rank/weight.
In our vote constructions, this can be achieved by simply creating an extended receipt
from the ri values. The procedure for the voter verification is similar to the procedure
for k-out-of-n approval votes. First, M must reveal the k individual verification codes
ws∗l : ∀s∗l ∈ S∗, instead of σ. Second,M adds to the receipt table T of size n by t, where
each entry Ti,j contains the confirmation code for candidate i with respect to rank/weight
j. Ti,j is defined as Ti,j = ri − jc = wi + tic − jc, where ti is the rank/weight given
to option/candidate i. Thus, for any candidate i, in column j = ti we have Ti,j = wi.
Finally, the voter checks if Ts∗l ,t∗s∗
l
= ws∗l : ∀s∗l ∈ S∗. For the [kmin, kmax]-out-of-n cases
we can, as in approval voting, use dummy candidates.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have described a very flexible technique to encrypt a diversity of
complex ballot types: [kmin, kmax]-out-of-n, weighted, ranked and multi-race ballots.
Additionally, our technique can be tuned for either mix net or homomorphic tallying
We’ve also shown how to extract a single, constant size, verification code from the vote
encryption, which we have proved to be honest-verifier zero-knowledge. When compared
with other confirmation code techniques, our approach is the only that supports a variety
of complex ballots formats with a single, constant size, verification code.
To use a single verification code we require the voter to have access to a trusted piece
of software/hardware to help him compute the verification code from the public election
data and hers secret selections. On the other hand, other vote confirmation techniques,
that use one verification code for each vote selection, rapidly become unusable with the
increase of the ballot complexity. Nevertheless, we have also shown how to create a more
traditional code voting receipt from our constructions, which allows the voter to verify
the correct vote encryption without the need of a trusted device.
Taking into account the reduced complexity of the recent shuﬄe by Bayer and Groth
[7], our constructions have a computational cost similar to the MarkPledge3 [32] but
present shorter proofs. Like the others protocols from the MarkPledge family, the con-
structions described in this paper offer a much higher soundness than the one provided
by simple cut-and-choose techniques, e.g. Benaloh challenges. On the other hand, the
use of Benaloh challenges in conjunction with Groth’s techniques [28] to prove a valid
ballot encryption will in most cases be more efficient (at the cost of the voter’s vote
verification soundness).
Our technique is safe to use in a coercion free environment, although in non-coercion
free environments the vote protocol designers must pay special attention to the challenge
generation to prevent coercion.
As future work we aim to design and implement a prototype of a voting system using
the verification methods proposed in this paper.
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